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This study assesses the feasibility of policy harmonization in the fight against terrorism in 53 
African countries with data for the period 1980-2012. Four terrorism variables are used, 
namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The empirical evidence 
is based on absolute beta catch-up and sigma convergence estimation techniques. There is 
substantial absence of catch-up. The lowest rate of convergence in terrorism is in landlocked 
countries for regressions pertaining to unclear terrorism (3.43% per annum for 174.9 years) 
while the highest rate of convergence is in upper-middle-income countries in domestic 
terrorism regressions (15.33% per annum for 39.13 years). After comparing results from the 
two estimation techniques, it is apparent that in the contemporary era, countries with low 
levels of terrorism are not catching-up their counterparts with high levels of terrorism. As a 
policy implication, whereas some common policies may be feasibly adopted for the fight 
against terrorism, the findings based on the last periodic phase (2004-2012) are indicative that 
country-specific policies would better pay-off in the fight against terrorism than blanket 
common policies. Some suggestions of measures in fighting transnational terrorism have been 
discussed in the light of an anticipated surge in cross-national terrorism incidences in the 
coming years.  
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 The 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13) has shown that terrorist activities 
have increased significantly after the 2011 Arab Spring. An eloquent case for illustration is 
the powerful Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which now occupies more than a 
third and a half of the territories of Iraq and Syria respectively. The wave of terrorism from 
ISIL is currently being felt across the world, with some notable examples including, the: 
foiled Verviers-Belgium attacks of January 2015; January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in 
Paris-France; Sydney-Australian hostage crisis in December 2014; failed February 2015 
Australian attacks and November 2015 stream of terrorist attacks in Paris.   
 The African continent has also been experiencing a surge in terrorist activities in the 
post- 2011 Arab Spring era (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015, 2016a). In the post-Gaddafi era of 
Libya, a significant portion of the country is controlled by ISIL-affiliated terrorists’ 
organisations. Moreover, there is now some consensus in academic and policy-making circles 
that the country has become a failed State, characterised with, inter alia: total anarchy and 
societal breakdown, with two rival governments desperately at war with many rebel factions 
to dictate the law of the land.  
 The 2015 Garissa University and 2013 Westgate shopping mall killings in Kenya have 
shown that the Somali Al-Shabab can still inflict substantial damages in the sub-region. In 
Tunisia, after a stream of political assassinations that has characterized the post- Arab Spring 
era, the newly elected government is now being confronted with a wave of attacks from ISIL-
affiliated Islamic fundamentalists, notably, the: Bardo National Museum and Sousse attacks in 
March and June 2015 respectively. The Boko Haram of Nigeria has been extending its sphere 
of terrorism to neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger. The November 2015 
Radison Blu Hotel attack and Sinai Russian plane crash in Mali and Egypt respectively, are 
more contemporary examples of the threat terrorism poses as a development challenge to the 
continent.  
 The African terrain is also fertile for breeding terrorism because it is characterized by 
recurrent political strife and instability. Some contemporary cases for illustration include: 
Burundi, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. In essence, a decision by Pierre 
Nkurunziza of Burundi to run for a third term in office has cast a shadow of political 
violence/instability across the country. The South Sudanese civil war and political crisis that 
began in December 2013 has resulted in hundreds of thousands of citizens displaced across 
the country and thousands of death. The current situation of the Central African Republic is 
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similar to the past experiences of socio-political unrests:  waves of failed coup d’états 
between 1996-2003 and the 2004-2007 Bush War. 
 The highlighted concerns are reminiscent of an atmosphere of political instability that 
has disrupted development on the continent over the past decades. Seven of the ten cases of 
substantial societal chaos and breakdown documented in contemporary development literature 
have been registered in Africa: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Zaire/Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Syria (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015).  Other important 
examples of political strife and civil wars include: Nigeria’s failed political transitions in 2008 
and 2011; the protracted politico-economic crisis in Zimbabwe; Kenyan 2007/2008 post-
election crisis; Angola (1975-2002); Burundi (1993-2005); Chad (2005-2010); Côte d’Ivoire 
(with another crisis that resurfaced  in 2011 after the 2002-2007 civil war and 1999 coup 
d’état); Liberia (1999- 2003); Sierra Leone (1991-2002); Sudan (with carnages in Durfur); the 
Congo Democratic Republic and Somalia.  
 There are two main strands in the literature on fighting terrorism. The first focuses on 
nexuses between macroeconomic variables and terrorism while the second is concerned with 
the mechanisms by which terrorism can be fought. Some studies in the strand on linkages 
between terrorism and macroeconomic variables include: the effect of terrorism on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008); linkages between terrorism,  
economic development and resource-wealth in conflict management (Humphreys, 2005; 
Meierrieks & Gries, 2013; Choi, 2015); the incidence of terrorism on innovation (Koh, 2007) 
and the relevance of foreign aid in the effect of terrorism on development outcomes 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015).  
 The second strand has been focused on investigating mechanisms by which terrorism 
and political violence can be curbed. Some of the documented channels by which such can be 
achieved include: education (Brockhoff et al., 2014), especially by means lifelong learning (  
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) and bilingualism  (Costa et al., 2008); the role of good 
governance (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016); publicity and press freedom (Hoffman et al., 
2013); military mechanisms (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); the relevance of geopolitical 
fluctuations (Straus, 2012); strategies founded on investigating terrorism behaviour (Gardner, 
2007) and transparency (Bell et al., 2014).  
 To the best of our knowledge, the engaged literature has stopped short of exploring the 
possibilities of formulating and implementing common policies against terrorism. Moreover, 
ineffectiveness in the fight against terrorism has been due to the absence of common 
internationally recognised long-term and comprehensive policies on counterterrorism 
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(Omand, 2005). This study fills the highlighted gap by assessing the feasibility of and 
timelines to common policy initiatives against domestic, transnational, unclear and total 
terrorism. The intuition underlying the assessment builds on recent theoretical underpinnings 
motivating the prediction of the Arab Spring based on negative economic and institutional 
signals, inter alia: inflation, unemployment and bad governance (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a). In essence, the underpinnings are relevant to this study because terrorism is a negative 
economic signal. The theoretical underpinning of the analysis is typically in accordance with 
cross-country convergence literature that has been substantially documented within the 
framework of neoclassical growth models  (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 
1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro  & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Fung, 2009) and recently 
extended to other development fields, notably: financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno 
et al., 2012); intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization (Asongu, 2013a; Andrés & 
Asongu, 2013a); common policies in the fight against African capital flight (Asongu, 2014a) 
and inclusive human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014b).  
 In order to put the above theory into more perspective, it is reasonable to expect that 
the elimination of cross-country differences in terrorism dynamics would lead to common 
policy initiatives for two main reasons. First, evidence of convergence in terrorism implies 
that countries with lower levels of terrorism are catching-up their counterparts with higher 
levels of terrorism. This implies that common policy initiatives against terrorism are feasible. 
Second, with complete catch-up in terrorism, cross-country differences in terrorism are no 
longer apparent such that, the underlying feasible common policy initiatives can be 
implemented without distinction of nationality, with the timeline to complete harmonization 
contingent on the ‘time to full catch-up’ (see Asongu, 2013b; Andrés & Asongu, 2013).  
 We strongly believe that inquiries should not be exclusively limited to acceptance or 
refutation of existing theories. Hence, the positioning of this inquiry is also within the 
framework of theory-building because we are substantiating recent methodological 
innovations based on reversed Solow-Swan. In essence, whereas the theoretical underpinnings 
of convergence have exclusively been limited to catch-up in positive signals, this study 
extends a new stream of literature on catch-up in negative signals (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016a; Asongu, 2014a). We argue that, while cross-country policy harmonization based on 
positive signals has been substantially documented, it is more relevant to initiate common 
policies based on negative signals because these are policy syndromes by conception and 
definition. Therefore, this study is also in accordance with Costantini and Lupi (2005, p. 2), 
Narayan et al. (2011, p. 2772) and Asongu (2014a, p. 336), by arguing that theory-building 
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and reporting of facts based on sound intuition are not useless scientific activities because 
room for improvements in scholarship would be substantially limited if studies were 
exclusively limited to either accepting or refuting exiting theories.  
 As documented by Islam (1995, 2003) and Narayan et al. (2011), it is not very likely 
to find convergence within a heterogeneous set of countries. The richness of our data (1980-
2012) enables us to disaggregate the dataset into fundamental characteristics of African 
development, notably: income levels, regional proximity, legal origins, religious domination, 
resource wealth, landlockedness and political stability. The choice of these fundamental 
characteristics is consistent with studies on common policy initiatives on the continent 
(Asongu, 2013b, 2014a). Moreover, we present a statistical justification for the fundamental 
characteristics before engaging them in the empirical section.  
 Two methodologies are adopted, namely: the beta catch-up and sigma convergence 
approaches. Beta catch-up is the reduction in cross-country dispersions within a panel of 
countries whereas; sigma convergence refers to cross-sectional reduction in dispersions across 
years. Beta catch-up is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sigma convergence due to 
concerns about multiple equilibria and initial endowments. For simplicity, we use the terms 
catch-up and convergence interchangeably throughout the study. The motivation for 
employing both empirical strategies is to ensure robustness on the one hand and provide room 
for more policy implications on the other hand.  
 In the light of the above, this study has a twofold contribution to the literature. First, 
by employing recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan, it contributes to 
theory-building in policy harmonization based on negative macroeconomic and institutional 
signals. Second, it contributes to the literature on fighting African conflicts by assessing the 
feasibility and harmonization of common policies initiatives against terrorism.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and links the 
theoretical underpinnings to existing conflict resolution theories. The data and methodology 
are covered in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical results while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Intuitions for the empirics and linkage with conflict resolution 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings  
 Consistent with the underlying literature on policy harmonization (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017a), in the post-Keynesian era, the initial economic growth theories that 
gained prominence with the resurfacing of the neoclassical revolution have created favourable 
conditions for convergence in development outcomes among countries. According to Mayer-
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Foulkes (2010), extension of market equilibrium concepts formed the bases for new economic 
growth theories that estimated absolute convergence. Within this framework, convergence 
among countries resulted from policies conducive to ‘free-market competition’ that 
articulated catch-up processes.  Seminal literature on convergence established the absence of 
catch-up (or absolute divergence) in per capita income (Barro, 1991). Pritchett (1997) 
confirmed the absence of convergence among countries. The bulk of studies within this strand 
of the literature is consistent with the view that  irrespective of differences in initial income 
levels, convergence in income levels is apparent at a common state or each country’s long run 
equilibrium, within the framework of a neoclassical (or exogenous) model of growth. On the 
other hand, consistent with the endogenous theory of growth, there are at least two 
justifications for the unfeasibility of income convergence, notably: the possibility of multiple 
equilibria and differences in initial endowments.  
 With the above in mind, the intuition for this study is consistent with the income 
catch-up strand of the literature that has been recently extended to other fields of economic 
development. In essence, studies using theoretical foundations of convergence have been 
substantially documented within the context of neoclassical growth studies that were 
originally framed by the seminal works of Barro (1991), Barro  and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 
1995), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Baumol (1986).  Moreover, a recent stream of the literature 
has been devoted to extending the theoretical underpinnings of income convergence (Swan, 
1956, Solow, 1956) to other economic development fields. Accordingly, whereas a consensus 
on an income convergence theory has been reached in scholarly circles, extension of the 
theoretical underpinnings of income catch-up to other development outcomes is a relatively 
new area of scholarship. The development of this new stream of literature is fundamentally 
motivated by at least two main arguments. First, catch-up should be beyond income 
convergence (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014b). Second, catch-up should not be 
exclusively limited to positive development outcomes (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). It 
follows from common sense that catch-up should be assessed both from positive and negative 
signals. Moreover, it can also be applied to other indicators of human development. In 
essence, the policy and scholarly challenge of accounting for the above perspectives is both 
consistent with:  empirical analysis for theory-building and assessment of the validity of 
existing theories within the frameworks of other development outcomes.  
 The highlighted challenge has motivated an evolving stream of literature, devoted to 
extending the theoretical underpinnings of catch-up literature to other development outcomes, 
inter alia in: (i) financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013b), 
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illicit capital flight (Asongu, 2014a), IPRs harmonization (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a; Asongu, 
2013a) and negative development signals like chaotic inflation, unemployment and bad 
governance (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). The present study is closest to the last stream on 
catch-up in negative economic and institutional signals. How it extends the underlying stream 
within the framework of terrorism has already been discussed in the introduction. But prior to 
engaging the empirical framework, it is relevant to articulate how the discussed theoretical 
underpinnings align with existing theories on conflict resolution.  
 
2.2 Linkage between theoretical underpinnings and existing conflict resolution theories 
 
 In accordance with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017a), the nexus between convergence 
in terrorism and the theoretical underpinnings of conflict resolution is based fundamentally on 
the intuition that with diminishing cross-country differences in terrorism, sampled countries 
can easily adopt common initiatives towards the resolution of conflicts because the threat of 
terrorism is becoming similar across countries. Some channels by which conflicts can be 
resolved are articulated by the Conflict Management Model (CMM) of Thomas-Kilman and 
the Social Control Theory (SCT) of Black. The highlighted theoretical underpinnings which 
have been substantially documented by Akinwale (2010, p. 125) have recently provided the 
theoretical basis for a stream of conflict management literature, notably: in the fight against 
terrorism (Asongu et al., 2015) in developing countries and political instability/violence 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) in Africa.  
 The CMM articulates that intentions of strategic nature that are most likely to revolve 
around assertiveness and cooperation, yield five conflict management styles, namely:  
avoidance, accommodation, competition, compromise and collaboration. On the other hand, 
the SCT postulates that linkages among organisations, groups and individuals substantially 
influence the exercise of one of the five principal instruments of social control, namely: 
tolerance, settlement, self-help, negotiation and avoidance. This narrative is in accordance 
with the conflict management literature (see Black, 1990; Borg, 1992; Thomas, 1992; 
Volkema & Bergmann, 1995).  
 The engaged theoretical underpinnings align with the present inquiry in the 
perspective that favourable conditions like cooperation and collaboration are more  likely to 
be apparent in the face of decreasing cross-country differences in terrorism dynamics. In other 
words, with diminishing cross-country dispersions in terrorism dynamics, sampled countries 
are more likely to adopt common policies in the fight against terrorism because the 
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phenomenon is becoming indifferent across countries. This is essentially because countries 
with low levels of terrorism are catching-up their counterparts with higher levels.  
 
2.3 Clarification of concepts  
2.3.1 Convergence  
 As documented in mainstream convergence literature (Islam, 2003; Asongu, 2014b), 
catch-up can be understood from various facets, notably: convergence across countries versus 
(vs) convergence within an economy; convergence in income vs. convergence in terms of 
growth; sigma-convergence vs. beta-convergence; absolute (unconditional) vs. conditional 
convergence; club or local convergence vs. global convergence; total factor productivity 
(TFP) convergence vs. income convergence and stochastic-convergence vs. deterministic-
convergence. According to the account, some linkages also exist between the plethora of 
definitions and adopted methodologies. However, this correspondence is not unique given 
that: (i) formal and informal cross-section techniques; (ii) time series and panel-based 
approaches (in part) have all assessed beta-convergence from either conditional or 
unconditional perspectives. Moreover, the techniques have for the most part, emphasised 
cross-country convergence on the one hand and per capita income convergence on the other 
hand. Furthermore, the panel technique and cross-section approach have been employed to 
investigate TFP and club-convergences. In essence, the cross-section technique has also been 
employed within the framework of sigma-convergence. Conversely, the time series technique 
has been employed to assess convergence across economies and within an economy. Lastly, 
the distribution technique has evolved beyond investigating sigma-convergence to engaging 
and assessing the entire shape of distributions.  
 The beta-convergence approach is required to assess catch-up in both income levels 
and growth rates. This is motivated by the assumption that decreasing returns are articulated 
by higher marginal capital productivity in less developed or capital-poor nations. According 
to the narrative, with identical rates of savings, poorer economies are bound to experience 
more growth because of higher marginal productivity in capital. Within this framework, a 
negative correlation is expected between initial levels of income and growth rates. This catch-
up scenario is known as beta-convergence. A disadvantage of the approach however is that 
reduction in dispersions cannot necessarily be concluded from an initial growth regression 
that reveals a negative beta. This empirical inconvenience has led to the rise of an alternative 
concept known as sigma-convergence, where sigma represents the decreasing cross-country 
standard deviations across years. In spite of the highlighted draw-back, beta-convergence is a 
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necessary but not a sufficient condition for sigma-convergence. Hence, researchers have 
focused more on the concept of sigma-convergence in order to address the underlying issues 
in beta-convergence (Asongu, 2014b). Nonetheless some researchers have also continued to 
employ the beta-convergence technique because it discloses information about structural 
parameters of growth, which is not provided by the distribution approach. In light of the 
above, both the sigma and beta catch-up approaches have been employed in recent literature 
in order to provide more room for robustness (Asongu, 2017a).  
  
2.3.2 Absolute convergence versus conditional convergence  
 
It is relevant to clearly articulate the concepts of absolute and conditional convergences. 
Consistent with the underlying literature (Asongu, 2013a; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017a), absolute convergence (AC) is fundamentally premised on common 
initiatives, policies and factors which include, inter alia: common monetary areas and 
economic communities. However, the framework of this inquiry extends beyond common 
economic/monetary areas to common policies against terrorism across countries.  Hence, AC 
is an indication that nations share some common fundamental features in terrorism 
occurrences such that, disparities across nations are only apparent with respect to initial 
terrorism levels. Hence, the absence of AC could be traceable to disparities in initial levels. 
On the other hand, evidence of terrorism implies that common fundamental characteristics 
existing among countries are facilitating the convergence process.  
 Conversely, conditional convergence (CC) shows the type of catch-up in which the 
nation’s steady state or long-term equilibrium is contingent on structural and institutional 
features that are fundamental to economic/currency unions. Therefore, CC is likely to occur 
when there are cross-country differences in factors that determine the underlying dependent 
variable (terrorism). It follows that if sampled nations differ in institutional and structural 
features that are exogenous to terrorism, catch-up may be apparent.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries for the period 1980-2012 with data from 
the Global Terrorism Database, African Development indicators (ADI) of the World Bank 
and terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011), Gailbulloev et al. (2012) and Asongu et al. 
(2017). The periodicity ends in the year 2012 because of constraints in data availability in, 
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notably: (i) macroeconomic and institutional indicators from the ADI of the World Bank on 
the one hand and (ii) terrorism variables from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) on the other hand1. Four different but related terrorism dependent variables are 
employed, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The 
dependent variable records the number of yearly terrorism incidents a country experiences. In 
order to avoid mathematical issues of log-transforming zeros and correct for the positive skew 
in the data, we are consistent with the underlying literature (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; 
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016) in taking the natural logarithm of 
terrorism incidents and adding one to the base.  
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). 
Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals 
of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters 
are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is  “ terrorism including those 
acts of terrorism that concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, 
supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from 
another”.  Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can 
neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum 
of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorism.  
No independent variables are employed because adopted estimation techniques are 
sigma convergence and unconditional beta convergence. In essence, the conditional beta 
convergence approach which is contingent on structural and institutional control variables is 
not adopted because of issues associated with the estimation technique, notably: differences 
initial endowments and multiple equilibria. 
Given that the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique  is 
adopted for the absolute beta convergence approach, we are faced with three major 
constraints. First, a basic condition for the employing of the GMM approach is that the 
number of years in the time series (T) should be higher than the number of countries (N). 
                                                 
1
 The data for the paper was collected in the year 2015. During this year, the stylized facts were built on the GTI 
(2014). At the time of the study, the terrorism data from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) were 
only available up to the year 2012. It is important to note that the Global Terrorism Database does not reflect 
dynamics in domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. These dynamics are only computed by Enders 




Hence, T<N. Second, a minimum of 5 periods is required for the employment of GMM. 
Therefore, T≥5. Third, the sub-sample with the lowest number of countries is North Africa 
with six countries (N=6). We address the three constraints by narrowing the sample to period 
1983-2012 and employing 6 year data averages or non-overlapping intervals such that, the 
number of periods is equal to 5 year (T=5). Hence adopted T is less than N in North Africa 
(N>T for the North African sample). The use of data averages is also motivated by that fact 
that it is unlikely to model catch-up using annual data because of short-run or business cycle 
disturbances that may loom substantially (Islam, 1995, p. 323). Conversely, the computation 
of sigma convergence does not require the employment of non-overlapping intervals (NOI) 
because the time series properties need to be exploited as much as possible for a 
comprehensive representation of standard deviations across time.  
 
3.2 Determination of fundamental characteristics  
 This section provides the criteria used in selecting fundamental characteristics of 
African development, based on: legal origins (English common law vs. French civil law), 
political stability (conflict-affected vs. politically stable), resource-wealth (resource-rich vs. 
resource-poor), income levels (low- vs. middle-income), regional proximity (SSA vs. North 
Africa), openness to sea (landlocked and coastal) and religious domination (Islam vs. 
Christianity). These fundamental features are consistent with Asongu (2014ab, 2017ab).  
 First, the premise of legal origin in distinguishing African countries has been 
substantially documented in contemporary development literature, notably on: (i) the quality 
of institutions (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999); (ii) adaptation to evolving economic conditions 
(Beck et al., 2003) and (iii) education, openness and economic growth (Agbor, 2015). The 
institutional advantage English common law countries may have over their French civil law 
counterparts (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) has been confirmed in more contemporary African 
literature (Asongu, 2012ab). The advantage in financial development established by Beck et 
al. (2013) has been confirmed within the frameworks educational performance and economic 
growth by Agbor (2015). In essence, the logic underpinning this classification is that, the 
institutional web of formal rules, informal norms and enforcement characteristics within a 
legal system influence how terrorism is fought by means of institutional regimes and 
government quality (Li, 2005; Choi, 2010; Lee et al., 2013).  Classification of countries 
within this category is based on information from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). 
 Second, with regard to the classification of countries that are affected by conflicts, 
some practical concerns emerge in terms of assigning a country to this category in a non-
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arbitrary and exclusive manner. In essence, since it is difficult for a country to be completely 
free from conflict, it is relevant to distinguish countries by focusing on the significance and 
periodicity of political instability. In this light, two strands merit emphasis: ‘civil war’ and 
‘political strife’ groups. The groups on civil war consists of: Angola (1975-2002); Burundi 
(1993-2005); Chad (2005-2010); the Central African Republic (with the 2004-2007 Bush War 
and waves of aborted coup d’états between 1996- 2003); the Democratic Republic of Congo; 
Côte d’Ivoire (1999 coup d’état, 2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 2011); Liberia (1999-
2003); Sierra Leone (1991-2002); Sudan and Somalia. With regard to the second group, 
though formal features of civil war may not be apparent, Nigeria and Zimbabwe are included 
in the study because of the magnitude of their internal strife. From common sense and logic, 
civil conflicts and political strife harbor favorable conditions for the proliferation of terrorism.  
 Third in the resource-wealth category, two concerns arise in selecting petroleum-
exporting nations. On the one hand, a nation could qualify for this category only for a small 
fraction of the sampled period, either due to a recent discovery of oil reserves or a decline in 
production. On the other hand, some nations also display macroeconomic features that are 
similar to those of petroleum-exporting nations. These include countries that substantially 
depend on mineral-intensive industries (e.g. Botswana). In order to address this concern, we 
exclusively select nations for which exports have dominated by petroleum for at least a 
decade of the sampled periodicity. Hence, the study takes a minimalistic approach by 
selecting exclusively petroleum-exporting countries that meet the criteria, namely:  Angola, 
Algeria, Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Libya and 
Sudan. 
 The fourth strand on wealth-effects has a twofold motivation. On the one hand, high-
income countries have been documented to have more resources in dealing with the negative 
effects of terrorism without engendering substantial negative externalities (see Gaibulloev & 
Sandler, 2009). On the other hand, the wealth of nations in Africa has also been documented 
to be exogenous to government quality (Asongu, 2012c), which is needed in the fight against 
terrorism. The classification of income-levels is in accordance with the Financial 
Development and Structure Database of the World Bank. These include: low-, middle-, ‘lower 
middle’- and ‘upper middle’-income countries.  
 Regional proximity is categorized in terms of SSA and North Africa for two main 
reasons. First, North African countries exclusively consist of Islamic states from which 
Islamic fundamentalism (which is a significant cause of terrorism) is likely to emerge. 
Second, consistent with Boyce and Ndikumana (2008), this distinction (which is in 
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accordance with World Bank’s regional classification) provides room for more policy 
implications.  
 In the sixth stand, unlike landlocked countries, nations that are open to the sea may 
provide more networking and movement opportunities for terrorism. Moreover, landlocked 
countries have been documented to be associated with lower institutional quality levels (Arvis 
et al., 2007) and hence could be more linked to political strife and civil wars that breed 
conditions for terrorism.  
 The classification of religious dominations is based on the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Fact book (CIA, 2011). As shown in Appendix 1, African countries may qualify 
for more than one category. Contrary to Weeks (2012), we are consistent with Asongu 
(2017a) in not imposing any constraints on categorical priority. Hence, a country may appear 
in more than one category as long as the country complies with the relevant categorical 
characteristics.  
 
3.3 Statistical validity of fundamental characteristics  
 It is not enough to select fundamental characteristics exclusively with intuition and 
justification from existing literature. This is essentially because the validity of fundamental 
characteristics may be contingent on the dependent variables on which they are motivated. 
Hence, we substantiate the choice of fundamental features by providing their statistical 
validities. For this purpose, we first present the validity of distinguishing African countries in 
terms of the discussed categories and then analyse the relevance of distinguishing terrorism 
variables within categories. Whereas Appendix 2 addresses the first concern, the second is 
tackled in Appendix 3. The corresponding ‘difference in means’ tests overwhelmingly show 
that the fundamental characteristics are different on the one hand and on the other hand, the 
terrorism variables within categories are also statistically different.  
 
3.4 Estimation technique 
3.4.1 Beta convergence  
 In accordance with Narayan et al. (2011) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017a), beta 
convergence can be estimated with the GMM approach to establish catch-up in selected 
dependent variables. Moreover, the estimation strategy is in line with the bulk of cross-
country evidence on income catch-up that has been investigated by pioneering papers with 
neoclassical growth models (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Baumol, 1986).  
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 As documented by Fung (2009), the two equations below are standard procedures for 
examining conditional beta catch-up if tiW ,  exhibits strict exogeneity. 
titititititi WTTT ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(    
   
     (1) 
tititititi WTaT ,,,, )ln()ln(    
                       (2) 
where, a = 1+ β, tiT ,  is the measure of a  terrorism dynamic (domestic, transnational, unclear 
or total) in country i at period t.   is tau,  tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of terrorism,  i  is a 
country-specific effect,  t  is a time- specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. Owing to 
decreasing marginal returns from the neoclassical growth model, a negative and statistically 
significant beta coefficient in Eq. (1) implies that countries relatively close to their steady 
state in terrorism activities will experience a slowdown in terrorism activities known as 
conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 2773; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  In 
the same light, as sustained by Fung (2009, p. 59), if  10  a in Eq. (2), then  tiT ,  is 
dynamically stable around the  path with a trend growth rate similar to that of  tW  and with a 
height relative to the level of tW .  Indicators contained in tiW ,  and the individual effects i  
are proxies for the long-term level terrorism is converging towards. In essence, the country-
specific effect i  measures other factors determining a country’s steady state that are not 
captured by tiW , .  
 The underlying literature maintains that conditions for catch-up are valid if and only if  
tiW ,  is characterised by strict exogeneity. Unfortunately, this is not the case in reality because 
where components of tiW ,  influence terrorism, the reverse effect is also possible. Within this 
framework, there is a possibility of reverse causality because terrorism also affects 
macroeconomic and institutional outcomes. In essence, we have seen from the engaged 
literature that terrorism has substantial macroeconomic consequences. Therefore, the study is 
confronted with a concern of endogeneity because the error term ( ti , ) is correlated with 
components of tiW , . This is the case with conditional beta catch-up that requires a 
conditioning information set (or control variables) for the modelling exercise. Within the 
framework of unconditional or absolute beta catch-up where tiW ,  is not required, the concern 
about endogeneity is still apparent between the errors are correlated with country-specific 
effects ( i ). Moreover, the time- and country-specific effects are likely to be correlated with 
other variables in the equation. This is probable to be most apparent when lagged dependent 
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variables are involved in the equations. A mechanism by which the underlying issues could be 
addressed consists of eliminating country-specific effects by taking first differences. 
Therefore, Eq. (2) becomes:  
)()()())ln()(ln()ln()ln(
,,2,,2,,,,     tititttitititititi WWTTaTT       (3)  
 
Unfortunately, the Eq. (3) can be still not be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) because it would result in biased estimators because of possible correlations between 
the error terms of lagged terrorism variables. Arellano and Bond (1991) have proposed the 
GMM technique in order to deal with the underlying correlation between the error term and 
lagged dependent variable. The procedure consists of employing lagged levels of the 
regressors as instruments in exploiting orthogonal conditions between the lagged dependent 
variable and error term.  
Given sample-bias concerns associated with the difference GMM approach, the 
system estimator has been developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) in order to correct the problem. The system estimation procedure employ Equations 2 
and 3 simultaneously by using lagged levels of the variables as instruments in the differenced 
equation and lagged differences of the variables as instruments in the level equation, thus 
exploiting all the orthogonal or parallel conditions between the error term and the lagged 
terrorism variables. Hence, for the above reason we employ both the difference and system 
estimators but give preference to the system estimator in event of conflict of interests in the 
results. This preference is in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4)2.  
 It is important to note that the system GMM approach builds on some restrictions on 
the dynamic process because according to Blundell and Bond (1998, pp. 115-116), the 
difference estimator is associated with: large finite sample bias and poor precision in 
simulation studies. Therefore, restrictions on the initial conditions process are employed in the 
system approach to enhance properties of the difference estimator. The first restriction justifies 
the employment of lagged differences as instruments in the level equation, in addition to 
lagged levels as instruments in the difference equation. “The second type of restriction 
validates the use of the error components GLS estimator on an extended model that 
conditions on the observed initial values” (Blundell & Bond, 1998, pp. 116).  
                                                 
2
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical 
application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth 
research”. (Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4).  
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While we are aware of fact that the Roodman (2009ab) GMM extension of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) may have better estimation properties, we do not use the xtabond2 Stata 
command for the purpose of these empirics for two main reasons. First, the estimation 
procedure we are employing is an innovation of the GMM technique that has not been 
properly worked-out with the use of forward orthogonal deviations as employed by Roodman 
(2009ab). Second, the Roodman approach is tailored to restricting identification or limiting 
instrument proliferation by, inter alia, the collapse of instruments in the procedure. Hence, the 
procedure is not specifically based on employing data averages or non-overlapping, which are 
essential in the: (i) mitigation of short-run or business cycle disturbances and (ii) computation 
of the implied rate of catch-up (see Islam, 1995, p.323).   
In the light of the above, the adopted system GMM approach in this study combines 
Eq. (2) and (3). In the specification, we choose the two-step GMM procedure to account for 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Accordingly, the  one-step process is homoscedasticity-
consistent. In line with Tchamyou and Asongu (2017), the hypothesis of the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals is very crucial because lagged regressors are to be used as 
instruments. Therefore, the estimation validity depends substantially on the hypothesis that 
lags of other independent regressors and the dependent variable are valid instruments in the 
regressions. In essence, we expect the first-order autocorrelation (AR [1])  test of the residuals 
to be significant while the second-order correlation (AR [2]) test to be insignificant.  Only the 
latter test which is more relevant is reported because it assesses the presence of 
autocorrelation in difference. The Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR)  test is employed 
to investigate the validity of instruments.  
In the light of the above, there at least four advantages associated with the system 
GMM estimation. It:  is appropriate when N>T; controls for endogeneity in all regressors; 
corrects for small sample biases in the difference estimator and does not eliminate cross-
country differences.  
As established by Islam (1995, p. 323), yearly periodicities are not appropriate for 
assessing convergence. As we have alluded to earlier, the author maintains that in such brief 
time spans, short-run disturbances may loom substantially. Hence, considering the 30 year 
periodicity, we use 6 year non-overlapping intervals (NOI)3. Justifications for the choice of 
the six year NOI have been provided in the data section.  
                                                 
3




In order to assess the decreasing cross-country variations in dynamics of terrorism, the 
implied rate of convergence is computed by calculating a/6. Therefore, we divide the 
estimated lagged terrorism variable by 6 because six-year NOI have been used to reduce 
short-term disturbances. Hence,   is equal to 6. It is interesting to note that the criterion used 
to examine evidence of catch-up is  ‘ 10  a ’, which means that the absolute value of the 
estimated lagged terrorism indicator is less than one but greater than zero. This implies that 
past variations have less proportionate effect on future differences. In other words, the left-
hand-side of Eq. (3) is moving toward equilibrium or decreasing over time across countries.  
 We devote space to eliciting the adopted convergence criteria. Accordingly, in the 
standard GMM approach, the estimated lagged value is a  from which 1 is subtracted to 
obtain β (β= a-1). In the same vein, 0  could also be employed as information criterion for 
beta-convergence. Within the framework of this study, for  the purpose of simplicity and 
clarity, a could be reported instead of β and the first information criterion ‘ 10  a ’ used to 
assess evidence of catch-up. This latter interpretation is consistent with recent convergence 
literature (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2017a).   
In the choice between absolute beta and conditional beta convergence, the study 
adopts the former method because of shortcomings in the latter methodology already 
discussed in Section 2. Accordingly, beside the concern about multiple equilibria, conditional 
convergence depends on variables in the conditioning information set. Hence, the model 
depends on the choice of control variables employed in the modelling exercise. Moreover, the 
beta catch-up is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of sigma 
convergence.  
 
3.4.2 Sigma convergence  
 
 Similar to the case of absolute beta catch-up, sigma convergence is estimated without 
a conditioning information set. It represents yearly decreasing dispersions in terrorism 
dynamics. In other words, sigma convergence can be inferred when yearly cross-country 
differences in terrorism activities are decreasing over time. Hence, contrary to the beta 
approach, non-overlapping intervals or data averages are not employed for sigma convergence 
modeling.  






















where,   is a standard deviation, N  is the number countries in a given year,  iT  is a terrorism 
indicator for country i ,    is the mean for a given year. The procedure for estimating sigma 
convergence denoted by Eq. (4) consists of observing the evolution in standard deviations 
across time. A decreasing tendency implies convergence.  
 
4. Presentation of results 
4.1 Beta convergence  
 Three concerns are investigated in this section, notably: (i) examination of evidence of 
catch-up or decreasing dispersions in terrorism dynamics (domestic, transnational, unclear 
and total); (ii) computation of the implied rate of catch-up or degree of reduction in 
dispersions and (iii) calculation of the time required for full catch-up or a complete 
elimination of cross-country differences in the underlying terrorism dynamics. Tackling the 
first concern provides insights into the feasibility of common policies based on similar cross-
country tendencies in the terrorism indicators. Addressing the second concern provides 
information on the degree of similarity in the underlying terrorism tendencies. Investigating 
the third concern informs the study about the time needed for completeness in underlying 
common tendencies or full elimination of cross-country dissimilarities. Put in other terms, 
whereas evidence of catch-up means that common cross-country policies against terrorism are 
feasible, full catch-up implies that underlying feasible policies can be enforced among 
sampled countries within a fundamental characteristic without distinction of locality or 
nationality.   
 Table 1 which summarizes the results presented in Table 2 provides information on 
how the three underlying issues in this section are addressed. As we have alluded to earlier, 
the absolute catch-up results in Table 2 are estimated exclusively with the lagged terrorism 
indicator as independent variable (with control for time effects). Panel A of Table 1 discloses 
findings of difference GMM whereas Panel B shows results of the system GMM. Both panels 
are further sub-divided to disclose specific findings corresponding to domestic terrorism (A1 
or B1), transnational terrorism (A2 or B2), unclear terrorism (A3 or B3) and total terrorism 
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(A4 or B4). The same chronology applies with Table 2 which discloses full results on which 
the summary in Table 1 is established. Consistent with the discourse in the methodology on 
apparent advantages of the system estimator compared to the difference estimator, preference 
is given to the system GMM estimator when conflicting results are apparent.  
 In order to examine the validity of estimated models and three catch-up concerns 
discussed above, three tests are performed, namely: (i) the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation 
test that investigates the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation; (ii) the Sargan 
over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test which assesses the validity of instruments and (iii) the 
Wald test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients which investigates the overall 
significance of estimated models. In the light of these criteria, for an estimated model to be 
valid, the: (i) null hypothesis of  the second order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation  test 
(AR(2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation in residuals should not be rejected; 
(ii) alternative hypothesis of the Sargan OIR should be rejected because it is the position that 
the instruments are not valid or correlated with the error term and (iii) null hypothesis of the 
Wald test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients should be rejected because it argues 
for the position that estimated coefficients are not jointly significant. We do not control for 
time effects in 10 of the 136 regressions because of issues in degrees of freedom. Moreover, 
unclear terrorism is not modelled in the North African sub-sample due to constraints in 
degrees of freedom.  
 From the findings in Table 2, most of the estimated models are overwhelmingly 
significant with: (i) on the one hand, rejection of null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan 
OIR tests and (ii) on the other hand, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald test. 
Moreover, we have also ensured that for most of the estimated models, the rule of thumb 
needed to restrict over-identification or instrument proliferation is respected: notably, the 
number of instruments is less than the number of associated countries, for the most part.  
 We devote space to providing insights into the computation of catch-up rates and time 
to full catch-up in Table 1. Given an estimated coefficient for an initial lagged terrorism value 
of 0.706 that is significant with no autocorrelation in the residuals and has valid instruments:  
(i) the catch-up rate is 11.70% ([0.706/6]×100) and (ii) the length of time needed for full 
catch-up is 51.28 years (600%/11.70%).  Therefore 51 years and approximately 102 days are 
needed to achieve 100% catch-up for an estimated initial value of 0.706 that is consistent with 
the convergence information criterion: 10  a .  
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 The following findings can be established. First, system GMM estimates are more 
significant compared to corresponding difference GMM estimators. Hence, as emphasised in 
the methodology section, in the presence of conflicting results, preference is given system 
estimators relative to difference estimators. Second, in domestic terrorism regressions, the 
following significant findings are apparent: Low income countries, with a catch-up rate of 
8.75% per annum (pa) and time to full convergence of 68.57 years (yrs); (ii) corresponding 
values for lower-middle-income countries  are 7.78% p.a and 77.12 yrs; (iii) upper-middle-
income countries (15.33% pa for 39.13 yrs); (iv) French civil law countries (13.23%  pa for 
45.35 yrs); (v) Landlocked countries (11.90% pa for 50.42 yrs) and  (vi) conflict-affected 
countries (14.10% pa for 42.55 yrs). Third, for transnational terrorism, the following catch-up 
rates and periods needed to achieve full catch-up are apparent: (i) Low income countries 
(5.98% pa for 100.3 yrs); (ii) low-middle income countries (10.91% pa for 54.99 yrs); (iii) 
upper-middle income countries ( 11.73% pa for 72.20 yrs ); (iv) French civil law countries 
(7.66% pa for 78.32 yrs); (v) conflict-affected countries (7.30% pa in 82.19 yrs) and (vi) 
Islam-oriented countries (6.85% pa in 87.59 yrs). Fourth, for unclear terrorism, catch-up rates 
and periods needed to achieve full catch-up are: (i) middle-income countries (11.93% pa for 
50.29 yrs); (ii) upper-middle income countries (11.73% pa for 51.15 yrs); (iii) Landlocked 
countries (3.43% pa for 174.9 yrs); (iv) Sub-Saharan Africa (8.65% pa for 69.36 yrs) and (v) 
Islam-dominated countries (9.70% pa for 61.85 yrs). Fifth for total terrorism, the following 
catch-up rates and periods needed to achieve full catch-up are established: (i) lower-middle 
income (9.50% pa for 63.15 yrs); (ii) Landlocked countries (9.35% pa for 64.17 yrs); (ii) 
conflicted-affected countries (12.23% pa for 49.05 yrs) and (iv) North Africa (14.85% pa for 
40.40 yrs).  
 The lowest rates of terrorism is in landlocked countries for regressions pertaining to 
unclear terrorism (3.43% pa for 174.9 yrs) while the highest rate of convergence is in upper-
middle-income countries for domestic terrorism regressions (15.33% pa for 39.13 yrs). 
Whereas no fundamental characteristic consistently exhibits catch-up across terrorism 
dynamics, the following sub-samples are not consistently significant: English common law, 









Table 1: Summary of results  
                  
 Panel A: Difference GMM   
 
     
 Panel A1: Domestic Terrorism    
 
     
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion  Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- --- 11.76 --- 8.90 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- --- 51.28 --- 67.41 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
                  
 Panel A2: Transnational  Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) No No No Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- --- 7.05 --- --- 10.03 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- --- 85.10 --- --- 59.82 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
                  
 Panel A3: Unclear Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No No na Yes No No 
Rate of C (%) --- 11.70 --- 10.11 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- na 10.33 --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- 51.28 --- 59.34 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- na 50.08 --- --- 
                  
                  
 Panel A4: Total Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- 9.15 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- 65.57 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
                  
 Panel B: System GMM   
                  
 Panel B1: Domestic Terrorism   
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No 
Rate of C (%) 8.75 --- 7.78 15.33 --- 13.23 --- --- 11.90 --- 14.10 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
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Time to FC (Yrs) 68.57 --- 77.12 39.13 --- 45.35 --- --- 50.42 --- 42.55 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
 Panel B2: Transnational  Terrorism   
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No 
Rate of C (%) 5.98 --- 10.91 8.31 --- 7.66 --- --- --- --- 7.30 --- --- --- --- 6.85 --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) 100.3 --- 54.99 72.20 --- 78.32 --- --- --- --- 82.19 --- --- --- --- 87.59 --- 
                  
 Panel B3: Unclear Terrorism   
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes na No Yes No 
Rate of C (%) --- 11.93 --- 11.73 --- --- --- --- 3.43 --- --- --- 8.65 na --- 9.70 --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- 50.29 --- 51.15 --- --- --- --- 174.9 --- --- --- 69.36 na --- 61.85 --- 
                  
 Panel B4: Total Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
Catch-up(C) No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- 9.50 --- --- --- --- --- 9.35 --- 12.23 --- --- 14.85 --- --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- 63.15 --- --- --- --- --- 64.17 --- 49.05 --- --- 40.40 --- --- --- 
                  
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English Common law countries. French: French Civil law 
countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NConf: Countries not 
Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. C: Catch-up. FC: Full Catch-up. Yrs: Years. na: not applicable because of 




















Table 2: Absolute Beta Catch-Up  
                  
 Panel A: Difference GMM   
 
     
 Panel A1: Domestic Terrorism    
 
     
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  




















 (0.306) (0.000) (0.319) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.280) (0.000) (0.658) (0.000) (0.203) (0.000) (0.002) (0.424) (0.000) (0.950) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.284) (0.119) (0.323) (0.373) (0.075) (0.332) (0.870) (0.065) (0.216) (0.139) (0.705) (0.072) (0.071) (0.405) (0.073) (0.441) (0.065) 
Sargan OIR  (0.481) (0.009) (0.323) (0.307) (0.055) (0.300) (0.445) (0.327) (0.541) (0.047) (0.273) (0.471) (0.124) (0.657) (0.329) (0.021) (0.229) 
Wald  (joint) (0.306) (0.000) (0.319) (0.000) (0.010) (0.059) (0.280) (0.001) (0.658) (0.000) (0.203) (0.000) (0.002) (0.424) (0.000) (0.950) (0.000) 
Wald  (time) (0.045) (0.013) (0.046) na (0.598) (0.038) (0.015) (0.016) (0.247) (0.038) (0.006) (0.000) (0.010) (0.343) (0.018) (0.191) (0.004) 
Instruments  9 9 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 6 33 20 53 
Observations  93 66 36 30 60 99 30 129 45 114 36 123 141 18 99 60 159 
                  
                  
 Panel A2: Transnational  Terrorism   
 
     
 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  





 (0.552) (0.325) (0.199) (0.066) (0.661) (0.132) (0.055) (0.141) (0.473) (0.743) (0.750) (0.016) (0.535) (0.846) (0.092) (0.682) (0.383) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.231) (0.855) (0.364) (0.306) (0.496) (0.227) (0.771) (0.269) (0.184) (0.585) (0.543) (0.128) (0.351) (0.052) (0.744) (0.799) (0.327) 
Sargan OIR  (0.376) (0.091) (0.361) (0.843) (0.190) (0.207) (0.192) (0.150) (0.063) (0.022) (0.112) (0.088) (0.066) (0.666) (0.053) (0.235) (0.021) 
Wald  (joint) (0.552) (0.325) (0.109) (0.066) (0.661) (0.132) (0.055) (0.141) (0.473) (0.743) (0.750) (0.016) (0.535) (0.846) (0.029) (0.682) (0.383) 
Wald  (time) (0.109) (0.526) (0.429) na (0.075) (0.080) (0.245) (0.044) (0.167) (0.451) (0.435) (0.062) (0.118) (0.223) (0.214) (0.126) (0.066) 
Instruments  9 9 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 6 33 20 53 
Observations  93 66 36 30 60 99 30 129 45 114 36 123 141 18 99 60 159 
                  
                  
 Panel A3: Unclear Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  

















 (0.339) (0.000) (0.203) (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.673) (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.426) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes na Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.615) (0.615) (0.193) (0.454) (0.336) (0.349) (0.554) (0.648) (0.613) (0.663) (0.194) (0.407) (0.847) na (0.781) (0.563) (0.994) 
Sargan OIR  (0.075) (0.240) (0.361) (0.546) (0.025) (0.081) (0.791) (0.071) (0.061) (0.094) (0.435) (0.041) (0.095) na (0.357) (0.572) (0.037) 
Wald  (joint) (0.339) (0.000) (0.203) (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.673) (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.426) (0.000) (0.000) na (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) 
Wald  (time) (0.212) (0.252) (0.678) na (0.182) (0.113) (0.435) (0.139) (0.027) (0.558) (0.447) (0.432) (0.206) na (0.144) (0.011) (0.187) 
25 
 
Instruments  9 9 9 6 13 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 na 9 9 9 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 na 33 20 53 
Observations  93 66 36 30 80 99 30 129 45 114 36 123 141 na 99 60 159 
                  
                  
 Panel A4: Total Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 
 Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  


















 (0.539) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.106) (0.108) (0.670) (0.012) (0.791) (0.077) (0.699) (0.000) (0.080) (0.246) (0.000) (0.719) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.071) (0.272) (0.841) (0.127) (0.137) (0.150) (0.142) (0.021) (0.201) (0.166) (0.644) (0.010) (0.059) (0.221) (0.078) (0.452) (0.038) 
Sargan OIR  (0.138) (0.032) (0.130) (0.358) (0.048) (0.148) (0.192) (0.062) (0.093) (0.029) (0.114) (0.061) (0.132) (0.331) (0.215) (0.036) (0.051) 
Wald  (joint) (0.539) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.106) (0.108) (0.670) (0.012) (0.791) (0.077) (0.699) (0.000) (0.080) (0.246) (0.000) (0.719) (0.023) 
Wald  (time) (0.118) (0.244) (0.214) (0.097) (0.516) (0.092) (0.475) (0.027) (0.006) (0.110) (0.283) (0.019) (0.033) na (0.010) (0.094) (0.014) 
Instruments  9 9 9 13 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 13 9 9 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 6 33 20 53 
Observations  93 66 36 40 60 99 30 129 45 114 36 123 141 18 99 60 159 
                  
                  
 Panel B: System GMM   
                  
 Panel B1: Domestic Terrorism   
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 





























 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.709) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.305) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.280) (0.097) (0.298) (0.334) (0.055) (0.303) (0.997) (0.068) (0.407) (0.120) (0.586) (0.074) (0.073) (0.287) (0.095) (0.256) (0.061) 
Sargan OIR  (0.596) (0.036) (0.400) (0.727) (0.105) (0.283) (0.806) (0.330) (0.324) (0.007) (0.358) (0.011) (0.059) (0.937) (0.097) (0.072) (0.087) 
Wald  (joint) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.709) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.305) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald  (time) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) na (0.125) (0.011) (0.027) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.027) (0.006) (0.124) (0.063) (0.004) (0.026) 
Instruments  13 13 13 9 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 6 33 20 53 
Observations  124 88 48 40 80 132 40 172 60 152 48 164 188 24 132 80 212 
                  
                  
 Panel B2: Transnational  Terrorism   
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 





























 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.188) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.260) (0.841) (0.421) (0.300) (0.410) (0.211) (0.767) (0.280) (0.099) (0.386) (0.472) (0.153) (0.348) (0.498) (0.799) (0.357) (0.286) 
Sargan OIR  (0.169) (0.019) (0.251) (0.980) (0.025) (0.287) (0.475) (0.088) (0.096) (0.017) (0.187) (0.031) (0.031) (1.000) (0.091) (0.318) (0.013) 
Wald  (joint) (0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.188) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
26 
 
Wald  (time) (0.032) (0.494) (0.000) na (0.008) (0.006) (0.101) (0.005) (0.000) (0.044) (0.043) (0.049) (0.035) (0.000) (0.120) (0.000) (0.036) 
Instruments  13 13 13 9 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 6 33 20 53 
Observations  124 88 48 40 80 132 40 172 60 152 48 164 188 24 132 80 212 
                  
                  
 Panel B3: Unclear Terrorism   
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 

























 (0.000) (0.000) (0.494) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.330) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes na Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.447) (0.639) (0.203) (0.439) (0.336) (0.171) (0.000) (0.685) (0.652) (0.689) (0.164) (0.403) (0.963)  (0.810) (0.390) (0.964) 
Sargan OIR  (0.077) (0.414) (0.855) (0.976) (0.025) (0.003) (1.000) (0.025) (0.149) (0.012) (0.347) (0.002) (0.218) na (0.428) (0.361) (0.053) 
Wald  (joint) (0.001) (0.000) (0.494) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.114) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.330) (0.000) (0.000) na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald  (time) (0.001) na (0.000) na (0.182) (0.021) (0.070) (0.089) (0.000) (0.359) (0.001) (0.656) (0.012) na (0.193) na (0.142) 
Instruments  13 9 13 9 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 na 13 9 13 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 na 33 20 53 
Observations  124 88 48 40 80 132 40 172 60 152 48 164 188 na 132 80 212 
                  
                  
 Panel B4: Total Terrorism   
 
     
 Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion Africa 































 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.142) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.078) (0.049) (0.805) (0.127) (0.100) (0.080) (0.314) (0.017) (0.148) (0.082) (0.459) (0.009) (0.051) (0.252) (0.093) (0.096) (0.027) 
Sargan OIR  (0.127) (0.020) (0.283) (0.358) (0.066) (0.135) (0.630) (0.061) (0.210) (0.008) (0.251) (0.017) (0.130) (0.797) (0.087) (0.235) (0.055) 
Wald  (joint) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.142) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald  (time) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.097) (0.447) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.060) (0.019) (0.135) (0.000) na (0.075) (0.023) (0.011) 
Instruments  13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 9 13 13 13 
Countries  31 22 12 10 20 33 10 43 15 38 12 41 47 6 33 20 53 
Observations  124 88 48 40 80 132 40 172 60 152 48 164 188 24 132 80 212 
                  
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable.  AR(2): Second-order Autocorrelation test. Sargan: Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) 
test. T.effects: Time effects. W (joint): Wald test for joint significance of estimated coefficients. W(time): Wald test for joint significance of time effects. Instr: number of instruments. C’tries: 
number of countries. Obs: number of observations. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the 
null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets. Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income 
countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum 
Exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NConf: Countries not 
Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. na: not applicable because of issues in degrees of 







 Consistent with the conceptual clarifications in the preceding sections, some important 
caveats are note worthy. Accordingly, employing econometrics beyond the empirical exercise 
of either accepting or refuting the validity of existing theories has some shortcomings. 
Fortunately, there is an evolving stream of literature supporting the empirical relevance of 
extending the theoretical underpinnings of income catch-up to other development fields. 
Within the framework of absolute beta convergence, corresponding literature (see Miller & 
Upadhyay, 2002; Apergis et al., 2010) is accords with the view that differences in initial 
conditions could lead to divergence or absence of absolute beta convergence. Hence, cases 
with lack of convergence could be traceable to cross-country disparities in initial levels of 
terrorism within sub-samples. Conversely, the presence of convergence is an indication that 
even beyond the constraint of differences in initial conditions between countries within a 
fundamental characteristic; the common fundamental features on which the sub-sampling is 
based are relevant in enabling nations with lower levels of terrorism to catch-up their 
counterparts with higher levels.  
 Given the apparent shortcomings in the absolute beta convergence approach, we are 
consistent with Asongu (2014b) in complementing the beta technique with the sigma 
convergence methodology. In essence, the absolute beta catch-up is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for sigma convergence.  
 
4.2 Sigma convergence  
 
 This section presents tabular and graphical findings of sigma convergence 
computations.  Values in Table 3 correspond to yearly standard deviations in domestic (Panel 
A), transnational (Panel B), unclear (Panel C) and total (Panel D) terrorism dynamics. The 
criterion for assessing sigma convergence is from evidence of decreasing standard deviations 
in terrorism dynamics across years. The standard deviations or dispersions are computed with 
the help of Eq. (4). Given the difficulty of observing changes in these dispersions across time 
for each fundamental characteristic in corresponding terrorism dynamics, the study 










Table 3: Tabular representations of Sigma convergence in terrorism dynamics  
                  
 Panel  A: Domestic terrorism 
                  
Year LMI MI UMI LI Eng. Frch. Chr. Islam LL NLL Oil NOil Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1983 0.775 0.971 1.211 0.487 1.073 0.266 0.877 0.339 0.823 0.693 0.585 0.765 0.690 0.740 0.768 0.000 0.729 
1984 0.508 0.909 1.260 0.602 0.945 0.588 0.850 0.526 0.608 0.792 0.718 0.745 0.693 0.740 0.762 0.580 0.739 
1985 0.200 0.954 1.409 0.402 1.015 0.352 0.848 0.000 0.324 0.780 0.219 0.748 0.270 0.762 0.720 0.000 0.680 
1986 0.538 1.095 1.549 0.330 1.135 0.350 0.904 0.384 0.244 0.872 0.589 0.785 0.549 0.803 0.793 0.000 0.750 
1987 0.698 1.108 1.503 0.511 1.133 0.529 0.937 0.550 0.566 0.896 0.219 0.889 0.615 0.866 0.798 0.924 0.811 
1988 0.951 1.306 1.695 0.632 1.292 0.704 1.128 0.657 0.609 1.084 0.895 0.998 0.821 1.017 0.999 0.788 0.971 
1989 0.862 1.174 1.516 0.867 1.227 0.785 1.180 0.535 0.836 1.069 0.841 1.043 0.770 1.068 1.035 0.731 1.001 
1990 1.651 1.544 1.477 0.745 1.178 1.151 1.325 0.807 0.731 1.286 1.653 1.026 1.562 1.019 1.181 0.963 1.151 
1991 0.897 1.198 1.526 0.816 1.086 0.938 1.039 0.890 0.664 1.094 0.980 0.992 0.707 1.058 0.961 1.226 0.989 
1992 1.385 1.693 2.072 1.047 1.288 1.389 1.269 1.483 0.866 1.478 1.600 1.284 0.858 1.463 1.156 2.470 1.342 
1993 0.921 0.891 0.900 0.124 0.515 0.651 0.428 0.813 0.179 0.696 0.630 0.598 0.200 0.672 0.360 1.379 0.599 
1994 1.329 1.599 1.947 0.861 1.144 1.266 1.027 1.460 0.926 1.310 1.464 1.148 0.786 1.303 0.961 2.446 1.211 
1995 1.259 1.433 1.689 0.755 0.732 1.278 0.875 1.391 0.984 1.151 1.516 0.982 0.955 1.126 0.775 2.356 1.099 
1996 1.160 1.322 1.554 0.820 0.948 1.121 0.860 1.323 1.047 1.063 1.333 0.966 0.833 1.097 0.827 1.914 1.049 
1997 0.732 0.714 0.728 0.786 0.821 0.705 0.831 0.612 1.041 0.606 0.219 0.820 0.508 0.812 0.790 0.000 0.750 
1998 0.734 1.069 1.410 0.688 0.764 0.930 0.744 1.052 0.860 0.874 1.507 0.638 0.857 0.870 0.679 1.760 0.864 
1999 0.633 0.957 1.283 0.628 0.725 0.817 0.698 0.910 0.796 0.780 1.224 0.611 0.807 0.765 0.652 1.514 0.781 
2000 0.687 1.044 1.383 0.588 0.781 0.826 0.743 0.913 0.764 0.831 1.345 0.613 0.797 0.807 0.664 1.605 0.806 
2001 1.039 1.104 1.231 0.671 0.601 1.008 0.818 0.977 0.904 0.874 1.491 0.627 1.165 0.739 0.758 1.589 0.874 
2002 0.400 0.814 0.421 0.685 0.667 0.783 0.679 0.836 0.839 0.688 1.123 0.607 0.776 0.718 0.611 1.440 0.734 
2003 0.317 0.649 0.914 0.554 0.662 0.549 0.538 0.679 0.757 0.506 0.934 0.468 0.447 0.628 0.477 1.180 0.589 
2004 0.431 0.552 0.695 0.444 0.532 0.466 0.421 0.584 0.559 0.463 0.775 0.382 0.502 0.486 0.411 0.885 0.487 
2005 0.317 0.467 0.615 0.643 0.564 0.604 0.519 0.673 0.690 0.542 0.672 0.570 0.545 0.601 0.560 0.788 0.584 
2006 0.907 0.891 0.856 0.649 0.779 0.755 0.592 0.950 0.755 0.764 1.175 0.596 0.906 0.605 0.703 1.137 0.757 
2007 0.863 0.849 0.868 0.970 1.214 0.678 0.590 1.220 0.515 1.029 1.167 0.831 1.397 0.590 0.907 1.022 0.913 
2008 1.037 0.952 0.856 0.737 1.105 0.589 0.420 1.187 0.505 0.928 1.284 0.674 1.275 0.534 0.793 1.107 0.826 
2009 0.799 0.882 1.005 0.936 1.052 0.820 0.628 1.175 0.477 1.029 1.202 0.813 1.429 0.558 0.862 1.271 0.905 
2010 1.061 0.973 0.877 1.034 1.201 0.878 0.816 1.263 0.970 1.025 1.282 0.928 1.490 0.608 1.000 1.110 1.001 
2011 1.467 1.169 0.390 1.085 1.605 0.653 0.728 1.511 0.654 1.242 1.574 0.965 1.813 0.580 1.162 0.542 1.111 
2012 1.998 1.742 1.427 1.276 1.957 1.133 0.948 1.979 0.818 1.667 2.253 1.216 2.072 1.155 1.417 1.785 1.486 
                  
                  
 
Panel  B: Transnational terrorism 
                  
Year LMI MI UMI LI Eng. Frch. Chr. Islam LL NLL Oil NOil Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1983 0.431 0.424 0.438 0.296 0.455 0.266 0.377 0.310 0.354 0.355 0.438 0.335 0.431 0.331 0.372 0.000 0.352 
1984 0.625 0.642 0.695 0.208 0.577 0.348 0.495 0.363 0.179 0.512 0.676 0.362 0.629 0.357 0.471 0.000 0.446 
1985 0.545 0.494 0.438 0.230 0.385 0.365 0.351 0.404 0.324 0.389 0.390 0.368 0.359 0.376 0.310 0.648 0.369 
1986 0.543 0.506 0.438 0.278 0.431 0.377 0.363 0.453 0.376 0.408 0.219 0.425 0.313 0.420 0.322 0.663 0.396 
1987 0.270 0.243 0.219 0.539 0.283 0.513 0.537 0.155 0.662 0.315 0.219 0.476 0.359 0.463 0.457 0.283 0.439 
1988 0.547 0.501 0.438 0.402 0.573 0.321 0.447 0.453 0.547 0.399 0.528 0.430 0.487 0.438 0.450 0.449 0.445 
1989 0.545 0.521 0.509 0.464 0.544 0.450 0.533 0.404 0.411 0.516 0.528 0.480 0.487 0.490 0.494 0.449 0.485 
1990 0.550 0.522 0.509 0.631 0.674 0.514 0.655 0.439 0.607 0.584 0.584 0.591 0.775 0.489 0.612 0.283 0.585 
1991 0.629 0.665 0.737 0.586 0.519 0.663 0.537 0.730 0.510 0.657 0.872 0.551 0.737 0.541 0.557 0.996 0.614 
1992 0.932 0.894 0.815 0.757 0.816 0.816 0.766 0.884 0.705 0.849 1.153 0.682 1.078 0.651 0.797 0.948 0.810 
1993 0.753 0.726 0.728 0.421 0.453 0.627 0.230 0.830 0.324 0.632 0.737 0.524 0.550 0.573 0.360 1.201 0.563 
1994 0.705 0.983 1.278 0.903 1.002 0.896 0.716 1.191 0.791 0.987 1.206 0.862 1.100 0.886 0.808 1.530 0.929 
1995 0.513 0.713 0.924 0.802 0.724 0.792 0.689 0.878 0.834 0.739 0.900 0.733 1.020 0.599 0.719 1.097 0.760 
1996 0.629 0.665 0.737 0.661 0.727 0.621 0.543 0.811 0.500 0.708 0.848 0.605 0.918 0.526 0.604 0.882 0.656 
1997 0.458 0.588 0.742 0.668 0.569 0.675 0.594 0.702 0.698 0.613 0.735 0.604 0.725 0.580 0.595 0.919 0.632 
1998 0.582 0.521 0.468 0.347 0.419 0.436 0.445 0.404 0.458 0.418 0.695 0.298 0.590 0.365 0.412 0.566 0.426 
1999 0.691 0.532 0.219 0.398 0.526 0.392 0.454 0.462 0.354 0.491 0.749 0.356 0.771 0.263 0.477 0.000 0.453 
2000 0.359 0.346 0.347 0.457 0.572 0.223 0.351 0.493 0.441 0.406 0.390 0.421 0.616 0.290 0.433 0.000 0.412 
2001 0.388 0.300 0.000 0.372 0.404 0.305 0.388 0.254 0.459 0.288 0.415 0.323 0.413 0.304 0.359 0.000 0.342 
2002 0.000 0.234 0.372 0.330 0.283 0.305 0.305 0.283 0.284 0.302 0.390 0.271 0.458 0.201 0.274 0.449 0.295 
2003 0.663 0.513 0.219 0.315 0.487 0.348 0.306 0.535 0.358 0.426 0.531 0.376 0.505 0.374 0.343 0.730 0.406 
2004 0.317 0.234 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.223 0.121 0.246 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.196 0.200 0.172 0.101 0.449 0.177 
2005 0.447 0.346 0.000 0.208 0.313 0.249 0.202 0.361 0.244 0.286 0.390 0.240 0.388 0.225 0.247 0.449 0.273 
2006 1.110 0.881 0.347 0.425 0.801 0.567 0.493 0.836 0.358 0.740 0.981 0.505 1.114 0.225 0.682 0.480 0.659 
2007 1.038 0.840 0.509 0.616 0.968 0.510 0.266 1.020 0.578 0.765 1.150 0.518 1.179 0.416 0.717 0.718 0.712 
2008 0.720 0.566 0.292 0.605 0.843 0.341 0.289 0.822 0.398 0.647 0.744 0.527 0.970 0.292 0.607 0.380 0.584 
2009 0.808 0.680 0.509 0.653 0.856 0.517 0.249 0.924 0.477 0.724 0.945 0.543 1.019 0.405 0.638 0.831 0.659 
2010 0.839 0.679 0.219 0.443 0.742 0.403 0.417 0.726 0.424 0.600 0.875 0.394 0.837 0.292 0.577 0.283 0.552 
2011 0.840 0.712 0.531 0.594 0.870 0.466 0.302 0.881 0.354 0.726 0.954 0.523 1.096 0.363 0.642 0.594 0.643 
2012 1.029 0.942 0.835 0.669 0.984 0.660 0.377 1.116 0.470 0.886 1.236 0.630 1.171 0.561 0.730 1.175 0.789 
                  
                  
 Panel C : Unclear terrorism 
                  
Year LMI MI UMI LI Eng. Frch. Chr. Islam LL NLL Oil NOil Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1983 0.634 0.611 0.615 0.000 0.435 0.382 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.470 0.695 0.297 0.634 0.304 0.423 0.000 0.399 
1984 0.400 0.515 0.634 0.230 0.462 0.321 0.467 0.000 0.179 0.430 0.438 0.367 0.400 0.376 0.399 0.000 0.377 
1985 0.317 0.613 0.856 0.256 0.649 0.223 0.545 0.000 0.324 0.479 0.347 0.460 0.317 0.470 0.463 0.000 0.438 
1986 0.388 0.651 0.896 0.197 0.644 0.287 0.550 0.213 0.000 0.528 0.390 0.468 0.359 0.479 0.471 0.283 0.452 
1987 0.200 0.564 0.791 0.256 0.616 0.168 0.495 0.213 0.324 0.446 0.219 0.446 0.359 0.431 0.436 0.000 0.412 
1988 0.200 0.579 0.815 0.361 0.632 0.302 0.564 0.155 0.354 0.502 0.000 0.507 0.000 0.518 0.482 0.283 0.462 
1989 0.000 0.628 0.931 0.528 0.808 0.312 0.702 0.000 0.605 0.552 0.000 0.624 0.317 0.622 0.599 0.000 0.566 
1990 0.562 0.844 1.112 0.444 0.838 0.473 0.777 0.213 0.411 0.709 0.630 0.644 0.579 0.658 0.668 0.283 0.635 
1991 0.270 0.808 1.170 0.315 0.845 0.306 0.698 0.254 0.287 0.653 0.219 0.625 0.270 0.635 0.604 0.000 0.571 
1992 0.000 1.055 1.542 0.278 1.093 0.305 0.865 0.313 0.317 0.814 0.347 0.768 0.000 0.796 0.736 0.449 0.706 
1993 0.400 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.225 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.566 0.190 
1994 0.400 1.121 1.580 0.575 0.983 0.742 0.817 0.883 0.661 0.903 1.054 0.791 0.694 0.880 0.751 1.365 0.836 
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1995 0.502 0.811 1.090 0.695 0.643 0.791 0.759 0.720 0.911 0.660 0.924 0.700 0.815 0.722 0.668 1.182 0.737 
1996 0.447 1.022 1.441 0.671 0.892 0.801 0.859 0.796 0.889 0.814 1.083 0.769 0.851 0.825 0.741 1.371 0.828 
1997 0.804 1.135 1.483 0.559 0.596 0.979 0.641 1.120 0.734 0.899 1.409 0.651 0.662 0.898 0.656 1.832 0.849 
1998 0.000 0.148 0.219 0.124 0.155 0.121 0.121 0.155 0.000 0.157 0.219 0.106 0.000 0.151 0.101 0.283 0.133 
1999 0.400 0.296 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.266 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.249 0.438 0.106 0.431 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.211 
2000 0.200 0.204 0.219 0.230 0.283 0.168 0.223 0.213 0.324 0.157 0.292 0.196 0.270 0.201 0.210 0.283 0.217 
2001 0.200 0.271 0.347 0.124 0.213 0.191 0.121 0.283 0.000 0.233 0.390 0.106 0.200 0.201 0.141 0.449 0.199 
2002 0.270 0.347 0.690 0.124 0.155 0.288 0.168 0.339 0.179 0.269 0.468 0.148 0.270 0.240 0.171 0.566 0.246 
2003 0.200 0.204 0.219 0.249 0.339 0.121 0.241 0.213 0.358 0.157 0.292 0.211 0.200 0.240 0.224 0.283 0.229 
2004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.108 0.101 0.000 0.095 
2005 0.200 0.148 0.000 0.124 0.213 0.000 0.121 0.155 0.179 0.112 0.219 0.106 0.200 0.108 0.141 0.000 0.133 
2006 0.447 0.365 0.219 0.000 0.338 0.168 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.286 0.478 0.106 0.428 0.151 0.224 0.358 0.245 
2007 0.465 0.343 0.000 0.173 0.360 0.168 0.000 0.404 0.244 0.261 0.509 0.148 0.465 0.151 0.270 0.000 0.255 
2008 0.538 0.423 0.219 0.173 0.454 0.121 0.168 0.441 0.179 0.342 0.589 0.148 0.549 0.151 0.309 0.283 0.304 
2009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.155 0.168 0.121 0.213 0.179 0.157 0.000 0.179 0.270 0.108 0.171 0.000 0.162 
2010 0.000 0.148 0.219 0.197 0.246 0.121 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.208 0.219 0.168 0.317 0.108 0.160 0.283 0.177 
2011 0.505 0.387 0.000 0.249 0.476 0.121 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.366 0.531 0.234 0.592 0.108 0.320 0.283 0.314 
2012 0.940 0.754 0.438 0.448 0.835 0.366 0.320 0.846 0.179 0.681 1.016 0.431 0.961 0.386 0.601 0.566 0.592 
                  
                  
 Panel D : Total terrorism 
                  
Year LMI MI UMI LI Eng. Frch. Chr. Islam LL NLL Oil NOil Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1983 0.980 1.098 1.267 0.565 1.122 0.517 0.988 0.443 0.868 0.824 0.898 0.822 0.909 0.798 0.874 0.000 0.832 
1984 0.835 1.074 1.344 0.661 1.047 0.716 0.970 0.638 0.630 0.937 0.998 0.816 0.925 0.811 0.888 0.580 0.855 
1985 0.662 1.074 1.466 0.521 1.102 0.542 0.952 0.404 0.544 0.879 0.584 0.840 0.550 0.858 0.815 0.648 0.794 
1986 0.766 1.183 1.591 0.459 1.183 0.573 0.977 0.615 0.398 0.980 0.749 0.882 0.686 0.900 0.868 0.720 0.852 
1987 0.745 1.131 1.513 0.738 1.170 0.727 1.066 0.589 0.851 0.952 0.390 0.997 0.759 0.967 0.919 0.964 0.917 
1988 1.001 1.333 1.707 0.774 1.345 0.787 1.195 0.770 0.818 1.136 0.974 1.075 0.873 1.102 1.071 0.926 1.048 
1989 0.992 1.252 1.565 0.986 1.341 0.857 1.279 0.652 0.987 1.144 0.967 1.134 0.916 1.154 1.130 0.849 1.097 
1990 1.649 1.582 1.571 0.961 1.314 1.217 1.438 0.875 0.945 1.363 1.662 1.158 1.621 1.126 1.286 1.010 1.250 
1991 0.809 1.267 1.689 0.947 1.174 1.047 1.142 0.966 0.781 1.193 1.153 1.082 0.684 1.154 1.067 1.244 1.087 
1992 1.462 1.808 2.214 1.159 1.486 1.452 1.425 1.515 1.024 1.576 1.673 1.398 1.119 1.535 1.322 2.341 1.451 
1993 1.071 1.048 1.076 0.429 0.651 0.819 0.477 1.045 0.354 0.859 0.906 0.725 0.590 0.802 0.496 1.620 0.754 
1994 1.278 1.696 2.155 1.087 1.433 1.333 1.188 1.586 1.151 1.443 1.543 1.323 1.022 1.422 1.163 2.463 1.358 
1995 1.271 1.501 1.806 1.006 0.996 1.355 1.069 1.453 1.165 1.261 1.572 1.147 1.219 1.198 1.001 2.340 1.225 
1996 1.256 1.491 1.803 1.011 1.243 1.226 1.108 1.409 1.232 1.233 1.432 1.159 1.086 1.219 1.061 1.915 1.221 
1997 1.003 1.287 1.623 1.032 1.044 1.201 1.049 1.285 1.242 1.104 1.442 1.057 0.992 1.163 1.040 1.831 1.134 
1998 0.836 1.121 1.440 0.734 0.814 0.976 0.820 1.064 0.919 0.918 1.527 0.682 0.907 0.908 0.748 1.779 0.911 
1999 0.899 1.072 1.300 0.716 0.857 0.890 0.813 0.989 0.858 0.893 1.364 0.688 0.978 0.801 0.782 1.514 0.876 
2000 0.767 1.082 1.412 0.751 0.941 0.863 0.818 1.012 0.893 0.911 1.347 0.743 0.954 0.852 0.790 1.613 0.899 
2001 1.078 1.134 1.243 0.753 0.712 1.040 0.877 1.017 0.984 0.913 1.463 0.701 1.184 0.792 0.823 1.605 0.924 
2002 0.451 0.843 0.383 0.739 0.702 0.831 0.732 0.866 0.886 0.738 1.147 0.656 0.775 0.745 0.659 1.496 0.778 
2003 0.756 0.827 0.947 0.616 0.817 0.635 0.600 0.863 0.830 0.657 1.078 0.583 0.651 0.720 0.583 1.293 0.704 
2004 0.502 0.582 0.695 0.476 0.532 0.517 0.444 0.612 0.559 0.509 0.775 0.436 0.550 0.513 0.435 0.879 0.518 
2005 0.590 0.589 0.615 0.675 0.671 0.631 0.566 0.725 0.755 0.598 0.783 0.611 0.649 0.641 0.619 0.793 0.640 
2006 1.330 1.194 0.914 0.750 1.050 0.920 0.741 1.214 0.814 1.023 1.426 0.763 1.269 0.649 0.928 1.258 0.961 
2007 1.216 1.089 0.941 1.058 1.389 0.817 0.633 1.428 0.778 1.162 1.502 0.908 1.566 0.714 1.057 1.152 1.060 
2008 1.175 1.054 0.898 0.850 1.246 0.666 0.536 1.274 0.615 1.034 1.383 0.774 1.407 0.597 0.918 1.047 0.931 
2009 1.029 1.026 1.054 1.037 1.211 0.912 0.662 1.300 0.661 1.143 1.359 0.903 1.530 0.662 0.984 1.333 1.024 
2010 1.230 1.113 0.914 1.070 1.314 0.927 0.882 1.355 0.995 1.120 1.397 0.969 1.510 0.671 1.080 1.157 1.078 
2011 1.534 1.267 0.672 1.113 1.671 0.737 0.760 1.545 0.658 1.320 1.680 1.000 1.898 0.659 1.209 0.572 1.170 
2012 2.049 1.812 1.514 1.325 2.008 1.208 1.007 2.023 0.904 1.725 2.337 1.271 2.126 1.212 1.471 1.889 1.542 
                  
LMI.: Low Middle Income countries. MI: Middle Income countries. UMI.: Upper Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. Eng: 
English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. Chr.: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. 
Oil: petroleum exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum exporting countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries. 
Con: Conflict affected countries. NCon: Non conflict affected countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. 
 
 
 Figure 1 below shows terrorism dispersions for the full African sample. The y-axis 
denotes cross-country differences in terrorism dynamics whereas the x-axis shows the period 
in terms of years. We first notice that dispersions in domestic and total terrorism are 
comparatively higher than those of transnational and unclear terrorism. Second, overall 
dispersions in terrorism dynamics broadly display almost a similar tendency throughout the 
sampled periodicity, notably: increasing differences in terrorism occurrences up to the early 
1990s when there is sharp fall, followed by sharp rise and a drop before a final phase of 
growth in the dispersions. The highest dispersions of each terrorism variable are apparent in 
2012. These increasing dispersions from 2004 are consistent with the broad absence of 
absolute beta catch-up in Tables 1-2.  
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It is important to note that no significant evidence of beta catch-up was apparent in all 
terrorism variables. Hence, whereas the beta approach provides insights into the absence of 
reductions in cross-country differences in terrorism variables, the sigma approach informs the 
study about what periods are responsible for this absence of convergence. In essence from 
Figure 1, the absence of convergence in traceable to two main phases, namely: 1983-1991 and 
2004- 2012. 
From the perspective of principal phases of increasing dispersions, the discourse in 
Figure 1 can be broadly extended to low- and middle-income (Figure 2), lower-middle and 
upper-middle income (Figure 3), English common law and French civil law (Figure 4), 
Christian-dominated and Islam-oriented (Figure 5), landlocked and Not landlocked (Figure 6), 
Resource-rich and resource-poor (Figure 7), conflict-affected and conflict-free (Figure 8) and 
Sub-Saharan African and North African (Figure 9) countries. Conversely, the established 
evidence of beta catch-up within specific fundamental characteristics for particular terrorism 
dynamics in Tables 1-2 is traceable to specific phases of decreasing terrorism dispersions in 
respective Figures. We consistently notice that for fundamental characteristics for which we 
establish a consistent absence of catch-up (see English common law, Oil-rich, Oil-poor, Not-
landlocked and Christian-dominated countries), with the exception of Petroleum-exporting 
countries for which high dispersions are not apparent in the starting phase (1983-1991), the 
high dispersions are consistently observable at the starting (1983-1991) and ending (2004-
2012) phases.  
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4.4 Further discussion of results, implications and caveats  
 
 For reasons we have already outlined in the methodology section, it is more reasonable 
to build policy implications from the sigma convergence results. In spite  of concerns about 
initial endowments and multiple equilibria that are associated with system GMM estimations, 
some researchers are increasingly distrustful of findings from system GMM that are partly 
based on a difference equation (see Roodman, 2007, 2008, 2009a; Bazzi & Clemens, 2010; 
Clemens et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the Roodman (2009ab) GMM extension that employs 
forward orthogonal deviations in place of fist differences has not been properly worked-out 
for the computation of the implied catch-up rate and time to full catch-up. Moreover, the 
estimation technique is not based on the use of non-overlapping intervals as means to limiting 
instrument proliferation because instruments are automatically collapsed in the modelling 
exercise.  
In the light of this clarification, whereas policy implications would essentially build on 
the sigma convergence findings, it is important to note that the absolute beta convergence 
results have been useful in providing an overall perspective of the catch-up pattern, whereas 
the sigma approach has provided more insights into possible reasons for the presence or 
absence of catch-up. Hence, both methods are complementary because one informs the 
researcher on whether catch-up is significant whereas the other provides insights into specific 
periodic intervals that could elicit the established evidence of catch-up. Accordingly, we have 
observed from the sigma convergence results that the absence of significant catch-up from 
beta convergence results can be substantially explained by the 2004-2012 phase in terrorism 
dispersions which is consistently characterised by increasing cross-country differences in 
terrorist activities. It follows that in the contemporary era countries with low levels of 
terrorism are not catching-up their counterparts with high levels of terrorism. As a policy 
implication, whereas some common policies may be feasibly adopted for the fight against 
terrorism, the findings based on the last periodic phase (2004-2012) are indicative that 
country-specific policies would better pay-off in the fight than blanket common policies.  
The above recommendations on the need for more emphasis on country-specific 
policies are consistent with the time to full catch-up required for policy harmonization in the 
corresponding absolute beta catch-up findings, which ranges from 39.13 to 174.90 years. This 
is in accordance with the European Union’s position that the fight against terrorism is first and 
foremost an issue of national competence (European Commission, 2015). Analysing 
suggested country-specific factors would consist of probing-into idiosyncratic factors that are 
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fundamentally the root causes of terrorism in some countries. In essence, substantial evidence 
of divergence is an indication that such fundamental factors are not similar across sampled 
countries and homogenous panels. While, this recommendation is more aligned with domestic 
terrorism, transnational terrorism can be fought with better cross-country policy 
harmonisation or coordination. 
The importance of policy coordination for transnational terrorism is in accordance 
with the 2014 Global Peace Index on an anticipated surge in terrorism activities in the coming 
years:  “Many macro 20 factors have driven the deterioration in peace over the last seven 
years including the continued economic repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis, the 
reverberations of the Arab Spring, and the continued spread of terrorism. As these effects are 
likely to continue into the near future; a strong rebound in peace is unlikely” (Arnet, 2014). In 
the light of this anticipated surge, if transnational terrorism incidences increase as forecasted, 
the need for more policy harmonization may be as relevant as the need for country-specific 
policies established within the framework of this study. The following are some measures that 
can grease efforts towards cross-country policy initiatives: creation of a legal framework and 
environment for cooperation; harmonization of capabilities in regions that are visa-free for 
citizens of member countries; financing member states of the African Union (AU) in the area 
of internal and transnational security against terrorism and better coordination between front 
line actors and practitioners.  
Hate speeches that permeate borders can be fought through the adoption of common 
legislations that combat xenophobia and racism as well as directives for audiovisual media 
services. Radicalization can be mitigated by means of networks sensitizing citizens of 
member states on the nefarious consequences of radicalization. The financing of terrorism can 
be prevented by instituting cross-country Terrorism Financing Tracking Systems (TFTS).  
The AU and other regional bodies need to substantially support member states affected by 
crises of terrorism. In essence, whereas crisis management as a result of terrorism attacks are 
for the most part concerns of national competence, developing effective fighting tools and 
supporting affected member states could help accelerate prevention and/or resolution of 
underlying crises. An example of such an initiative is the latest development against the Boko 
Haram. Accordingly, the AU’s  Peace and Security Council has recently validated a resolution 
for the adoption of a formal framework for a multinational joint task force involving affected 
countries, notably: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Other measures that could be adopted 
in order to step-up the fight against terrorism include orientation of regional and AU’s internal 
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security towards reinforcing internal security in order to address challenges posed by current 
and potential terrorists threats. 
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
 
 This study has assessed the feasibility of policy harmonization in the fight against 
terrorism in 53 African countries with data for the period 1980-2012. Four terrorism variables 
have been used, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The 
empirical evidence is based on absolute beta catch-up and sigma convergence estimation 
techniques. The implied rates of catch-up and time to full catch-up are provided with the beta 
technique. In order to avail room for policy implications, the data is disaggregated into 
fundamental characteristics of African development, based on: legal origins (English common 
law vs. French civil law), political stability (conflict-affected vs. politically stable), resource-
wealth (resource-rich vs. resource-poor), income levels (low- vs. middle-income), regional 
proximity (SSA vs. North Africa), openness to sea (landlocked and coastal) and religious 
domination (Islam vs. Christianity). The intuition for the analysis is that catch-up in terrorism 
indicates common policies against terrorism are feasible, while full catch-up implies that the 
underlying feasible policies can be implemented without distinction of nationality within a 
fundamental characteristic. The beta approach provides insights into evidence of catch-up 
whereas the sigma convergence strategy discloses periodicities that elicit the presence or 
absence catch-up. There is substantial absence of catch-up. The lowest rate of convergence in 
terrorism is in landlocked countries for regressions pertaining to unclear terrorism (3.43% per 
annum for 174.9 years) while the highest rate of convergence is in upper-middle-income 
countries in domestic terrorism regressions (15.33% per annum for 39.13 years). 
 After comparing results of the two estimation techniques, it is apparent that in the 
contemporary era, countries with low levels of terrorism are not catching-up their counterparts 
with high levels of terrorism. As a policy implication, whereas some common policies may be 
feasibly adopted for the fight against terrorism, the findings based on the last periodic phase 
(2004-2012) are indicative that country-specific policies would better pay-off in the fight than 
common blanket policies. The above recommendation on the need for more emphasis on 
country-specific policies is consistent with the time to full catch-up required for policy 
harmonization in the corresponding absolute beta catch-up findings.  
While, this recommendation is more aligned with domestic terrorism, transnational 
terrorism can be more effectively fought with cross-country policy harmonisation or 
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coordination. However, if transnational terrorism incidences increase as anticipated by some 
reports, the need for more policy harmonization may be also as relevant as the need for 
country-specific policies. Some suggestions of measures in fighting transnational terrorism 
have been discussed in the light of an anticipated surge in cross-national terrorism incidences 
in the coming years.  
Since terrorism can be contingent on revolutionary features that spread across nations, 
future studies devoted to extending the extant literature could focus on alternative estimation 
techniques like the employment of spatial models of econometrics in order to account for 
spillover and diffusion impacts. Another step in this direction may be to consider estimation 
techniques that capture the correlation between data subgroup events and other common 
events. The employment of Dynamic Conditional Correlation (Chiang et al., 2007; Al 
Rahahleh & Bhatti, 2017) and Copula (Ahsnaullah & Bhatti, 2010; Bhatti & Nguyen, 2012; 
Nguyen & Bhatti, 2012; Jong-Min & Jung, 2016) methodologies that are designed to analyze 


































Appendix 1: Categorization of Countries 
Categories  Panels Countries Num 





   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 






Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 




Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
33 
    








Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
   47 
   
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia. 6 
    
Religion  Christianity  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 





   
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Libya , Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,  
20 





Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 





 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 




    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 




Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 





Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 




Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 




Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
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Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
 
Appendix 2: Differences in the means of fundamental characteristics  
         
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English Frenc
h 
Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.385) (0.000) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.381) Mid 
  na (0.341) (0000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.163) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.341) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000 (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.232) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.232) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.000) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. Null Hypothesis: Difference in means =0. P-values in 




Appendix 3: Differences in the means of fundamental characteristics in terrorism dynamics  
         
Panel A: Domestic Terrorism   
        
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.803) (0.002) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.803) Mid 
  na (0.001) (0.055) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) (0.438) (0.000) (0.432) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) English 
     na (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.597) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.017) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) Conf 
           na (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.031) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel B: Transnational Terrorism   
                 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.047) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.234) (0.001) (0.702) (0.000) (0.000) (0.437) (0.061) Low 
 na (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.702) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.437) Mid 
  na (0.000) (0.895) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.908) (0.000) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.024) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.356) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.080) English 
     na (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.356) (0.007) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.380) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.380) (0.000) (0.018) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.295) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.295) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.303) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.303) (0.011) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.283) Chrit 
               na Islam 
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Panel C: Unclear Terrorism   
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.069) (0.001) (0.000) (0.057) (0.519) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.495) (0.002) (0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.567) (0.068) Low 
 na (0.001) (0.000) (0.519) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.497) (0.000) (0.496) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.567) Mid 
  na (0.047) (0.025) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000) (0.222) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.765) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.007) (0.131) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.882) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.140) (0.022) (0.131) (0.000) (0.000) (0.882) (0.117) French 
      na (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.006) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.002) (0.874) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.874) (0.003) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.252) Conf 
           na (0.002) (0.000) (0.252) (0.007) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.260) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Panel D: Total Terrorism   
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Religion   
Low Mid LMid UMid English French Oil NOil Closed Open Conf NConf SSA NA Chrit Islam  
na (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.811) (0.001) Low 
 na (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.811) Mid 
  na (0.001) (0.032) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.454) (0.000) (0.530) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) LMid 
   na (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.591) (0.000) (0.000) UMid 
    na (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.620) English 
     na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.620) (0.000) French 
      na (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) Oil 
       na (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.023) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NOil 
        na (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) Closed 
         na (0.000) (0.814) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.000) Open 
          na (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) Conf 
           na (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) NConf 
            na (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) SSA 
             na (0.000) (0.000) NA 
              na (0.018) Chrit 
               na Islam 
                 
Low: Low Income countries. Mid: Middle Income countries. LMid: Lower Middle Income countries. UMid: Upper Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:  
Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa. NA: North Africa. Chrit: Christian dominated countries. Islam: Muslim dominated countries. Null Hypothesis: Difference in means =0. P-values in 
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